whether they are over-confident or not. But it has happened before. Just saying that if they were to come out expecting Nebraska to roll over after getting embarrased at home last week, it could get ugly.

Staying focused is definitely key in this game.

43 pages will take some time.

The analysis of going for it on 4th and short is predicated by the fact that n (the number of occurrences) is very small and that in fact the author actually used 3rd and short for his analysis, assuming that there is no difference between the two scenarios.

While in theory I support the concept, the fundamental flaw with the analysis is the human pshycology of entering the different situations. This is not adequately addressed in the analysis in that it only considers the consequences of a bad play (output) as far as momentum and outcome of the game and does not consider the human factors that may lead to the success or failure of the play entering it (input). If the human factors could be overcome or at least factored in (and I think they could – LSU seems to have it down), then I think the analysis holds a lot more water.

Entering the play, there is a significant difference in play calling, the perceived goal of the play, and the perceived importance of the play on both sides of the ball in a 4th and short scenario versus a 3rd and short scenario. In a 3rd down and short scenario, the offense is as likely to pass as any other scenario, forcing the defense to react to the play. This is always the advantage that the offense holds over the defense. In a 4th and short scenario, the offense almost always runs the ball, allowing the defense to plan and load the box and taking away their best advantage. Further, the 4th down psychology says “I need to gain 2 yards” and is limiting in that both the coaches and the players are only focused on getting 2 yards such that it becomes a sort of glass ceiling. They call a play designed to pick up 2 yards (QB sneak) and the player thinks all they need is 2 yards versus play calling and a mentality that says pick up as many yards as possible. The 4th and short play is also significantly more important to the defense than to the offensein terms of “making a statement” and in the huge advantage in field position that it affords their offense. While there is a sense of do or die for the offense trying to gain a first down, I don’t know that they necessarily have the same sense of urgency even though it may put their defense in a more significant hole. For the offense there is a sense of there always being another day in terms of doing their job of scoring points (except in come from behind scenarios which the author did not consider in his analysis). For the defense, there is no other day. 4th and short situations just don’t happen that often.

Were some of the human factors taken away – even just by running the regular offense versus a short yardage formation – the simple probability statistics of gaining the necessary yardage, the potential for points notwithstanding, would practically justify going for it on 4th down and short. I think this is the approach that Les Miles takes at LSU. I am making up numbers here, but say LSU averages 5-6 yards a play. If the devaition is 1.5 yds, he has at least a 95% chance of gaining at least 2 yards on any given play, as long as he runs his base offense and the defense is forced to play their same defense. If the pass is taken out of the equation, the defense is playing the run, and the offense is averaging 3-4 yards per carry, the odds of gaining 2 yards drop to only about 60%. Now, you’re really gambling.