Going for it on forth down

the first time. It was boneheaded and lacked real thought. I think Leach owned up to it as he should have. Probably the worst call of his career from where I stand. I’m all for getting past it and moving on but a really bad decision cost this team a loss IMO. The idea of going for it was bad but what made it even worse was the play itself. Believe it or not even the captain makes bad decisions like most coaches every now and then.

I don’t think you can make decisions that maximize points. Maximization is a theoretical condition that is fun to talk about and calculate but practically unobtainable in real life because of chaos and risk.

I am not sure I agree with this. If you’re right, there really isn’t a justification for kicking extra points, either, because the only possible justification for kicking extra points is that it maximizes points (what else could it be? We should kick extra points because it makes us feel good?). In any event, point maximization is really just a proxy for “strategy that produces the most wins.” I think coaches should adopt the strategy that produces the most wins and, if it is indeed the case that a point maximization strategy does that (which may very well be a settled empirical fact — or not) then the risky strategy is to adopt anything else.

Can be fun and easy when you are playing with numbers and computers but these are games with scores of people and environmental variables that prevent the repetitions from being equal. It could be said Coach failed to maximize Tech’s points by not kicking the FG because he risked too much striving for the perfect equation. The game, the rankings, the season, people’s careers could all be hanging on that one yard, theoretically. It was the wrong decision because he didn’t give enough respect for the risks of a zero outcome.

Lots here so I’ll try and itemize. 1) The fact that we’re talking about a chaotic game does not, in my opinion, diminish the usefulness of complicated statistical modeling. I doubt that you disagree. Indeed, the basis for a defense of FGs is that they are safer, which is entirely a statistical matter; field goals from the one yard line are successful something like 98% of the time. Were they successful 41% of the time, I doubt we would be discussing the merits of a FG strategy. 2) When selecting between competing strategies, the right one is that which maximizes your chances of winning. I happen to be an extraordinarily risk-averse person in real life, which is an embarrassing way of saying that I select losing strategies daily. Statistical swings are something that coaches should take into consideration, but it shouldn’t be the only driving factor. Were that the case, coaches would kickoff out of bounds in order to drive the % of kickoff returns for touchdowns to 0. But they don’t. 3) Romer’s point, and one I want to adopt, is that coaches don’t maximize the likelihood of winning and that they have good reasons not to, but the reasons not to (fear of criticism) would be universally rejected by fans as operation outside of what we want coaches to do. I want a coach to adopt the strategy that is most likely to yield the most wins. I do not want a coach to adopt the strategy that is most likely to better “the rankings, the season, people’s careers…” Not because I don’t care about those things, but because those are all proxies for success. Winning is not a proxy for success; it is success. A coach’s job should be to produce the most wins. The other stuff is just window dressing. 4) I do not believe it is the case that coaches — or anyone, for that matter — who adopt a maximizing strategy that happens to have larger statistical swings is showing little enough respect for the risk of a zero outcome. No one would argue that a coach who kneels the ball on 4th and goal on the opponent’s one is to be applauded for giving the requisite respect for a non-zero outcome (that the FG will be blocked and returned for a touchdown). Risk aversion is certainly a factor to be considered in strategy selection, but the right answer is not necessarily the most risk-averse strategy. Supposing it is the case that we beat Houston 6 out of 10 times using Leach’s strategy, but 4 out of 10 times using the safe strategy, the “riskier” pick is the “safe” one = kicking the FG. That’s really the crux of what I’m saying; I think it is demonstrable that going for it in many instances is statistically less risky, for the reason that it produces more victories. I may be wrong that the strategy is actually more efficacious, but that will need to be demonstrated.

He was greedy and prideful. His offense can move the ball a yard, by damn, or it’s not worthy of winning. Unless the QB slips, trips, fumbles, is stepped on OR coach’s play is rejected by the opponent.

I think Mike Leach is a strange person, but I really am not sure he’s the egomaniac opposing fans accuse him of being. He strikes me as a person who approaches the game of football scientifically and, that being the case, I’m very unsurprised by the decisions he makes on 4th down that happen not to comport with what is, in my opinion, conventional unwisdom. If he’s wrong, if he’s selected the wrong strategy, I don’t think it is because he is bullheaded or prideful. I truly believe that in Mike Leach’s head, going for it with 10 minutes left in the 4th quarter increases his odds of winning. And that’s refreshing, because I often think it is the case that coach’s make decisions that decrease their odds of winning but also decrease the likelihood that they will be fired.

Supporting example #1: Read some stories about Goldman Sachs and their stock trading computers that maximized dollars. Worked great until it almost took the company down when risk and chaos jammed the gears.

I would love to read about it but you provided no links. I think Goldman Sachs is a successful business entity, but if I’m wrong about that and they’ve failed due to their strategy adoption, I’m fairly certain that said failure can be explained on the merits (or lack thereof) of their strategy alone. If this example supports your theory solely because it points to a risky but lucrative strategy that failed, I reject the analogy as unhelpful for the same reasons I would reject a “Kick out of bounds on 100% of kickoffs” strategy. See hitting on 16 example below.

Supporting example #2: I suspect some readers have traded stock over the last few years. Ever been stung by that maximization theory when failing to take reasonable profits you ended with less or a loss?

Likelihood of success on 4th down with a yard to go is a stable statistic that does not swing wildly from year to year. As was revealed over the past few years, stock investment does swing wildly, unexpectedly. If we had reason to believe that next year, the % of success on 4th down and a yard would decrease by half, maybe it isn’t a strategy to marry ourselves to. My simple point is that if Mike Leach believes the odds of conversion on 4th and a yard are X, and the odds of a successful FG are Y, it could very well be t he case that the first strategy is the right one. Again, I don’t think anyone disagrees, as X could be 100% and Y could by 0%. What we’re arguing about is whether or not X is high enough to justify the former. But surely you agree that X could be some number where kicking a FG is unhelpful? Should the answer to the question “What number does X need to be” hinge solely on the fact that Y is safer? Obviously not, as plugging in 99% for X and 100% for Y would not yield the result “KICK THE FG.” What would X need to be, FOR YOU, in order to justify going for it? Should we base the answer on the emotional fear of failure or on which strategy increases the likelihood of winning? Why aren’t these two concepts merged? My overall point is that the strategy that produces the least wins is the riskier one, regardless of how successful it is on any given down.

Supporting example #3: Many, many, many, MANY coaches, with far more experience than ours, don’t pass up the points because they learned about the zero outcome.

There are a number of things wrong with this. First, it assumes that Mike Leach hasn’t learned about the zero outcome. Second, it suggests that the right decision is the most popular one. (The world did not cease to be flat the day that 51% of the people adopted a round-world hypothesis.) Third, many many many many coaches, with far more experience than ours, did not adopt the spread offense. Is there anything to be said for their decision? Should it compel us, or coach?

Supporting example #4: You have the perfect roulette strategy. You are maximizing like a son of buck. Why would you ever stop!!!??? Then you have a heart attack on the way to the pisser and can’t enjoy the WINNINGS.

I do not know how to respond because I must be missing the point. Coach should’ve gone for three because the team might have a heart attack before we have an opportunity to play another game? Assuming you’re correct, that I have the “perfect” strategy, why would my fear of a heart attack cause me to adopt a worse strategy? Supposing I had a roulette strategy that yielded me a victory 51% of the time… would my fear of losing my heartbeat while on the way to the pisser cause me to adopt a strategy that produced victory 49% of the time? Why? Because that strikes me as absolutely illogical. Fear of mortality is precisely the reason why strategy selection is so important — life is too short to be wrong! Even if I knew that the Houston game was the last game in the history of the program, I would still select a strategy that won 51% of the time over any strategy that produced victory 49% of the time, correct?

Blackjack: You have 16. The dealer has 7. Many players feel as though staying is the safer strategy, and indeed there’s some psychology in play; eight out of thirteen cards will kill you, you are more likely to bust, if you hit, than not. But players who stay on 16 against a dealer’s 7 are irrational; the correct strategy is to hit. The intuition is simply wrong, staying on 16 is not “safer” — it is the riskier strategy for the reason that it increases the likelihood that you will lose money. Kicking FGs might be statistically “safer” in that the swings are much lower, but it is the riskier strategy because it increases the likelihood that the good guys will lose the game.

It was an ivory tower, theoretical, egg-headed decision that cost us the game.

If he’d gone for the FG and we’d lost by 2, would his decision have been wrong because it was “ivory tower, theoretical” and “egg-headed”? I really could care less what reasons Leach has for adopting the winning-maximizing strategy. I do not know how helpful introducing the ivory tower to this issue is, besides appealing to FOOTBAW FANS’ general fear of anything produced by Berkeley academics. I’ve always felt that football is a thinking man’s game, and I’ve little patience for ivory tower types who insist it is not. But if we’re really taking the position that decisions are wrong because they’re supported by Berkeley academics, maybe ivory tower criticisms of FOOTBAW are correct.

I hope not.